On the eve of the 2008 financial crisis, there was a popular saying on Wall Street: "Risk has been diversified enough."

Subprime mortgages, CDOs, CDSs, layered hedging, risks are disassembled, packaged, and sold. It seems that risks are everywhere, yet it appears that there are none.

In the end? The risk hasn't disappeared; it's just that no one knows where it ultimately nests.

The story on the chain is now being replayed exactly as it was.

Many advanced players will naturally form a set of "correct thinking": not going all in, rejecting single point failures, multi-protocol configuration, multi-chain deployment, multi-wallet management, and multi-strategy operations. It sounds professional, rational, and flawless.

But there's a hidden trap here—

When you start to "intentionally diversify," the risk usually does not decrease, but rather loses its boundaries.

The decentralization on the chain has always come at a cost. Each added protocol increases the risk of authorization. Each time a chain is crossed, an additional dependency on bridging is introduced. For every additional wallet, there is a greater chance of operational errors. Individually, these risks may seem minor. However, when combined, they create a labyrinth of risks that is hard to articulate.

This is why veteran players often say: "I clearly didn't do anything wrong, but I always feel like one day it's going to be over."

This sense of unease is not a delusion.

Looking back at recent cases of explosive failures, you will find a pattern: it is often not that users are too aggressive, but rather that **the configuration has become too complex**. There is no problem with individual protocols, no problem with single chains, and at the time, there seemed to be no issue with individual authorizations. The problem lies in the overall loss of control.

Simplicity often allows for a longer life than cleverness.