The backdoor incident in Trust Wallet version 2.68 warrants an in-depth review. By analyzing code diffs, it was discovered that hackers directly tampered with internal extension logic, hijacking mnemonic phrases when users unlock their wallets, and then stealing private key information through disguised metrics domains. This is not a supply chain contamination but a professional APT-level intrusion—attackers likely gained development deployment permissions before December 8.

From on-chain data, as of the time of the incident disclosure, approximately 33 BTC (worth about 3 million USD) had been stolen, along with about 3 million USD worth of ETH and Layer 2 assets. The hackers subsequently dispersed assets via CEXs and cross-chain bridges, indicating a strong anti-tracking awareness behind these operations.

Key signals: 1. If you are using the Trust Wallet extension, disconnect from the internet immediately for troubleshooting. 2. Export your private keys and transfer assets to another wallet immediately. 3. This type of incident reminds us that the security of open-source wallets ultimately depends on the control of each link in the supply chain—mere code visibility is insufficient to guarantee security. Moving forward, attention should be paid to the flow of hacker assets, as these data often reflect their next moves and potential trading counterparts.