#GOLD #Silver #Copper #platinum

According to Bloomberg’s report, it appears that in some scenarios Russia is putting on the table the possibility of a partial return to the dollar-based payment/settlement system with the U.S., within the framework of strategic agreements on the energy/commodities axis and a broader financial normalization. This framework does not erase the rising de dollarization narrative in one day, but it changes something important: if a bargaining ground forms where a major commodities player re accepts the network effect of the dollar, the structural demand discussion for the dollar and U.S. Treasury bonds strengthens again. As a matter of fact, demand for U.S. Treasuries increased with this news. Gold sold off.
At this point, the equation the market is reading is simple: if an actor at Russia’s scale takes de facto steps to increase dollar usage in part of trade, and these steps turn into real normalization on the sanctions/channel access side, the need for global dollar liquidity and the tilt toward dollar-based assets can be supported marginally. While this affects yield dynamics through increased demand for U.S. Treasuries, it can also reduce the priced-in premium of doomsday scenarios like “the dollar is losing reserve status” or “debts will be inflated away by printing money.” Gold sold off for this reason as well.
On the gold side, it would be wrong to reduce the strong recent performance to a single reason, but the strengthening of narratives like debasement creates a risk premium on gold. The weakening of this premium or its coming off the table creates a channel where gold can give back part of its upward pricing. Still, because gold is an asset where multiple variables work together, such as central bank buying, geopolitical risk premium, and real rates, this channel may not be decisive by itself in every condition.
The critical tension here is that Trump’s sometimes-mentioned desire for a weaker dollar and the outcome that the market mechanism can produce may go in different directions. Theoretically, a controlled devaluation supports exporters, but at the same time, raising tariffs, a pro-growth fiscal stance, and shifts in risk perception can pull capital into U.S. assets and lead to a stronger dollar. In other words, even if the policy preference points to a weaker dollar, on the market side capital flows and yield differentials can create pricing in the opposite direction through an “invisible hand” effect.
As a result, even if Trump wanted a weaker dollar, in the short term a certain combination of news flow and risk perception can run the following chain: increased demand for U.S. Treasuries = support for the dollar = trimming the doomsday premium on gold. Whether this turns into a lasting regime should be read not from a single headline, but from concrete steps on sanctions/normalization, the path of real rates, and the trajectory of global risk appetite.
The simple explanation is this: big rallies look for an excuse to correct. It needed to cool off for a while.