MrBeast Editor Involved in "Insider Trading": Kalshi's Fine Exposes the Dark Side of the Prediction Market

Author: Frank, PANews

On February 25, 2026, the prediction market platform Kalshi issued a fine of $20,397.58 to a YouTube editor. This precise figure, down to the cent, marks the first publicly disclosed insider trading penalty in the history of the prediction market industry.
The individual penalized is Artem Kaptur, the visual effects editor for the world’s largest influencer MrBeast. He invested about $4,000 in trading event contracts related to MrBeast on Kalshi and earned $5,397.58. However, this seemingly small profit triggered a significant regulatory signal across the industry, prompting the CFTC (U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission) to release an official enforcement consultation notice targeting prediction markets.
Nevertheless, Kalshi is a verified KYC platform, making it relatively easy to catch a trader using real identities. The real question is: what happens if those with the same inside information turn to Polymarket, which requires no identity verification?
PANews analysis found that in the Polymarket contract for season 2 of MrBeast’s reality show Beast Games, the winning probability of the eventual champion was pushed to 94% by funds three weeks before the season ended, exhibiting textbook insider trading characteristics.
Starting from Kalshi’s penalty, combined with on-chain data anomalies on Polymarket, PANews delves into how insider trading has transformed from a Wall Street-exclusive term into a gray area accessible even to editing room assistants in the era of “anything can be bet on.”

The First Insider Trading Penalty in Prediction Markets
According to Kalshi’s disciplinary notice, Kaptur traded event contracts related to MrBeast’s channel during August to September 2025, leveraging his position at Beast Industries.
Kalshi’s monitoring system detected highly abnormal statistical features: Kaptur achieved an “almost perfect trading success rate” in low-odds markets. Since Kalshi’s trading data is fully public, multiple platform users also identified this anomaly and reported it proactively. Under dual triggers, Kalshi froze Kaptur’s account and launched an investigation.
The final penalty was the confiscation of all illegal gains of $5,397.58, plus a $15,000 punitive fine, totaling $20,397.58, and a two-year platform ban.

On the same day, another more absurd case was disclosed. California Republican gubernatorial candidate Kyle Langford bet about $200 on his own election on Kalshi and then posted screenshots of the trade on X to show off. Kalshi froze his account that day and ultimately imposed a five-year ban and a $2,246.36 fine.
While these fines are not large, their signals far exceed the monetary amounts. On the same day, the CFTC issued an official enforcement consultation, explicitly citing Section 6©(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act, indicating both cases could constitute federal violations. CFTC Chairman Mike Selig stated on X:

“Our exchange is the first line of defense against insider trading in prediction markets. If you attempt manipulation, fraud, or insider trading, we will find you and take action.”

This marks the first direct warning from a U.S. federal regulator regarding insider trading in prediction markets.

Beast Industries issued a statement affirming a “zero tolerance” stance toward insider trading among employees and has initiated an independent internal investigation. However, the company also suggested that Kalshi should “be more transparent” in communicating investigation results in the future.

But all these efforts rest on a premise: Kalshi is a centralized KYC platform where user identities, bank transactions, and IP addresses are fully known. Catching a trader using real identity doesn’t reveal much. The real issue is: what if those with the same inside information choose a platform like Polymarket, which requires no identity verification and allows anonymous wallets and USDC settlement?

94% on Polymarket: The Beast Games Champion Leaked on Chain
While Kaptur was penalized for earning over $5,000 on Kalshi, MrBeast was pushing a much larger project. The second season of Beast Games, a reality show in partnership with Amazon Prime Video, premiered on January 7, 2026, featuring 200 contestants competing for a record-breaking $5.1 million prize. The finale aired on February 25, revealing the ultimate champion: Player 167, Tyler Lucas, a former U.S. Air Force pilot and ex-Wide Receiver at the University of Pennsylvania.
However, on Polymarket, this result seemed to have been “publicized” three weeks earlier.

PANews analyzed the odds changes for the contract “Who will win Beast Games Season 2?” on Polymarket and discovered an extremely abnormal money flow. During the early stages of the show, when many contestants were still in the game and the finals were far off, the share of bets on Player 167’s victory experienced persistent buying pressure that defied normal market logic.

From the timeline, the abnormality was clear and significant. Between late January and early February 2026, before the show entered the second half of elimination rounds, the probability of Player 167’s victory began to sharply diverge from fundamentals. By February 4, three weeks before the finale, Tyler Lucas’s winning odds had surged to 84%. By February 18, just one week before the finale, implied probability was pinned above 94%.

In stark contrast, other top performers in the show were almost “priced at zero.” In a 200-person competition relying on physical and mental tests, without insider information, rational funds would find it hard to price a single contestant’s winning probability above 90% midway through the season.

Reddit communities and Polymarket comment sections exploded with discussions. Headlines bluntly pointed out: “The champion was basically leaked on Polymarket,” drawing parallels to the early leak of season 1 winner Jeff Allen, but this time the pattern was even more blatant.

Odds are just surface-level indicators. PANews fully scraped and analyzed on-chain transaction data for this market, uncovering more direct evidence than odds movements.

The entire Beast Games Season 2 market recorded 111,000 trades involving 2,640 unique addresses. Among these, one data point stood out: 795 addresses only traded the contract for Player 167 during the entire market lifespan. Out of 25 contestants, only the eventual champion was “coincidentally” targeted, a concentration far beyond normal betting logic.

Further cross-referencing all suspicious addresses’ transaction histories across the platform, considering their share of Beast Games trades, overall platform win rates, and inter-address relationships, PANews identified 147 highly suspicious addresses. Among them, 16 exhibited textbook insider trading features—they only participated in Beast Games markets and had no trading records in any other markets.

Within these 16 addresses, the most suspicious, “0xA1F3Cf8Ba7410956a2955D5300A9be7Ff1dBc07E-1767992471439,” only engaged in three Beast Games sub-markets, all profitable, with a 100% win rate, totaling $3,237 in gains. Multiple similar addresses showed comparable patterns, suggesting deliberate distribution of bets to reduce attention.

More concerning are those who profited heavily on Beast Games but did not only trade MrBeast-related markets. Their trading behaviors further deepen suspicion. PANews identified multiple “address clusters” with highly synchronized timing and actions. On January 27, the largest trading day for the market (with a daily volume of $44,547), the top suspicious address completed all 12 trades within 17 minutes, earning $11,830. Two anonymous addresses executed sell trades within the same minute on January 30 at 09:41, each profiting $3,542—mirroring each other in amount, timing, and behavior.

So, who could confidently place such bets midway through the season? The sources point to a very limited group: the massive post-production team of Beast Industries, the 200 contestants and their close social circles, and staff involved in scheduling and announcing (investigations found multiple addresses focused on film and TV contracts with extremely high win rates). Kaptur’s $4,000 trading on Kalshi earned over $5,000, but on Polymarket, the top suspected insider addresses have collectively profited over $100,000—likely just the tip of the iceberg.

Features and Unfairness of the Game
Kalshi can precisely confiscate $5,397.58 in illegal gains because, as a regulated centralized exchange, all user identities, bank transactions, and IP traces are fully visible to auditors. But on Polymarket, users only need to connect MetaMask or other decentralized wallets to trade; on-chain transactions are transparent, but behind addresses are anonymous.

The deeper divide lies in philosophy. Kalshi’s compliance officer Robert DeNault explicitly defines information asymmetry as a violation that must be strictly punished. In contrast, Polymarket CEO Shayne Coplan has publicly expressed a very different stance: insider trading is a “feature, not a flaw” of prediction markets.

The Beast Games champion being “leaked” on Polymarket three weeks early at 94% odds may be a direct result of such systemic arbitrage. For ordinary players with no inside advantage, participating in such predictions essentially makes them fuel for the insiders—just “farming” the retail crowd.

From a broader perspective, prediction markets aim to turn collective intelligence into price signals. But when they become large-scale “whale” positions, the game may no longer reflect collective wisdom but rather the shadow of informational privilege.